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Abstract – Internet technology is so pervasive today, for example, from online social networking to 
online banking, it has made people’s lives more comfortable.  Due the growth of Internet technology, 
security threats to systems and networks are relentlessly inventive. One such a serious threat is 
“phishing”, in which, attackers attempt to steal the user’s credentials using fake emails or websites or 
both. It is true that both industry and academia are working hard to develop solutions to combat against 
phishing threats. It is therefore very important that organisations to pay attention to end-user awareness 
in phishing threat prevention.  
   Therefore, aim of our paper is twofold. First, we will discuss the history of phishing attacks and the 
attackers’ motivation in details. Then, we will provide taxonomy of various types of phishing attacks. 
Second, we will provide taxonomy of various solutions proposed in literature to protect users from 
phishing based on the attacks identified in our taxonomy. We conclude our paper discussing various 
issues and challenges that still exist in the literature, which are important to fight against with phishing 
threats. 
 
Keywords: Phishing, Security, Malware, Social engineering, Spam, Visual similarity, Data mining, 
Machine learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the past, one of the most profitable crimes is ‘identity theft’ [1]. Identity theft is the crime in 
which criminals steal personal identity or financial information such as banking details [56]. In 
traditional way as discussed in [2], criminals commit crimes either by killing the victim and pretend to 
be the legitimate person or steal confidential information from garbage, where criminals access 
information from discarded letters, financial records, electricity bills, and many others bills which are 
dumped without shredding properly.  
 
The concept of ‘phishing’ came from traditional ‘fishing’, in which a fisher trolls in a boat on the river 
and uses bait to catch the fish. Similarly, ‘phisher’ also trolls the Internet by using any communication 
method and uses bait to convince the user and steal user’s credentials. The information provided by 
phishers seems to be legitimate at first glance. Figure 1, which depicts the exponential growth in the 
number of Internet users, year by year [41, 42]. 
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Figure. 1 Growth in number of internet users from 2000 to 2015 [41,42] 
 
Figure 2 shows the size of the Internet users in the world by various geographic regions. This is the 
recent information according to Internet World Stats [43]. Similarly, figure 3 shows Internet 
Penetration Rates in the World by Geographic regions according to Internet World Stats [43]. 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Internet Users (in Millions) in the World by Geographic regions [43] 
 
 
3	
	
Figure 3. Estimated World Internet Penetration Rates in the World by Geographic regions [43] 
 
Over 250,000 Twitter accounts and over 110,000 job applicant’s NPI (National Provider Identifier) 
were compromised in Virginia Tech’s website in early 2013 [66]. In addition, about 74,000 students, 
staff and faculty members of University of Delaware became a victim of phishing attack and 
researchers discovered that users’ personal details were stolen by an using an existing vulnerability on 
their website [63]. According to C. Goggi, Phishing attacks were one of the most serious type of threats 
in 2013 [40]. Malcovery reported that in last quarter of 2013 the top five targeted companies by 
phishers were Facebook, WhatsApp, UPS, Fargo and Companies House (UK) [44]. Sheng et al. 
showed that, women were more likely to be a victim of phishing than men. Similar goes for people 
from 18 to 25 years of age, possibly due to the lack of awareness against phishing threats [45, 56, 61, 
62]. According to RSA monthly online fraud reports [65], phishing attack is increasing vigorously 
over years as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure. 4 Phishing attack incidents  
 
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) gathered security details from 
various agencies, which stated that there were 107,655 incident in 2011, 43,889 of which were on 
federal agencies [46]. In May of 2015, construction, engineering, transportation and 
telecommunication sectors were a target of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT3) phishing campaigns. 
FireEye identified it to be a zero day attack. The employees received phishing emails having malicious 
URLs, upon clicking them they redirected to compromised web server, and the target system 
downloaded an infected Adobe Flash Player SWF file and FLV file which made a backdoor [66]. 
 
Hillary Clinton presidential campaign chairman, John Podesta’s Google email account was “hacked” 
in March 2016 prior to the US election [86]. The hacker simply sent a phishing email to Podester’s 
gmail account and lured him to disclose his login credentials. In the phishing email, Podesta had been 
invited to click on a link (i.e. Unified Resource Locator, so called “URL”) warning him to change his 
password immediately. However, the URL did not link to a secure Google web page, instead directing 
the user blindly via bit.ly, which is a service used to shorten URLs. Podesta hack didn’t require much 
technical skills.  Instead, the hacker merely used social engineering techniques to make the attack 
successful.  The simplicity of the attack, of course, does not make less impact of the crime and makes 
it no less illegal either. 
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Therefore, the aim of this paper is to look at the current phishing literature to determine seriousness of 
the problem. To give a brief overview of evolution of research in this field as well as current trends in 
phishing and its remedies to provides a view of the issues and challenges that are still prevailing in this 
area of research. In this paper, we will provide an overview of Phishing problem, history of phishing 
attacks and motivation of attacker behind performing these attacks. We will also provide taxonomy of 
various types of phishing attacks. In addition to this, we will provide taxonomy of various solutions 
proposed in literature to detect and defend from phishing attacks.  
 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains overview of phishing attack (i.e. 
background, history, phishing lifecycle, motivation, and performance evaluation metrics). Taxonomy 
of phishing attacks is then discussed in section III. Section IV presents taxonomy of defence solutions. 
Phishing attacks in the Internet of things (IoTs) are discussed in Section V. Current issues and 
challenges are discussed in VI. Finally, section VII concludes the paper and discusses the scope for 
future research work. 
 
II. Phishing Attack Overview  
A. Background and History 
 
Security has been an issue in the field of computer technology since early 50’s. In 1950’s, the computer 
had techniques to ensure that a particular application is not able to use memory other than allotted to 
it. Several encryption and access control techniques to protect passwords etc., were developed in 
1960’s. Computers were studied as a new complete domain in the 1970’s. We have the concept of 
“Phone Phreaking” since the 1950’s till 1980’s, that is where the phrase “ph” in “Phishing” comes 
from replacing “f” in ‘fishing’ [2]. In 1950, J. Engressia, discovered by accident that certain 
frequencies can telephone switches with perfect pitch. In 1960, Bell published a paper [47], which 
included the actual frequencies used for the routing codes. Leak of these codes started a new trend, 
which was irreversible. In 1964, AT&T began to monitor telephone calls to track phone “phreakers.” 
In 1969, as described in [11] "phone phreaking" was invented by a retired air force technician J. T. 
Draper. He created a worldwide famous device the ‘Blue Box’ an electronic device which could use 
the tones in use by a telephone company so that it was possible to make long distance calls for free, in 
1972 he got arrested for toll fraud charges. In 1978, DEC’s marketing manager G. Thuerk sent first 
international commercial spam. A single mass e-mail was written and sent to 393 West Coast 
ARPANET users for advertising the availability of a new model of DEC computers [2,66]. In 1983, 
K. Thompson first described a security threat, which is called as “Trojan horse”. An electronic 
magazine named as ‘Phrack’ which was written by and for hackers, begun publishing in 1985 [2]. A 
timeline diagram describing various events before Phishing is shown in figure 5.  
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Figure. 5. A timeline diagram describing various events before phishing as described in [5] 
 
We described in detail about the “phishing” era of 1990’s and onward in figure 6. In December 1995, 
it has been reported that hackers attempted to break into DoD (US Department of Defense) computers 
about 250K times in the same year and 65% of them were successful. In 1996, as described in [11], 
the term ‘phishing’ was used first time by hackers who stole America On-line (which is the  largest 
Internet Service Provider in US) by getting access to the passwords of AOL users. As described in [2], 
phishing was first mentioned on the Internet by the “alt.2600” hacker newsgroup in January 1996, in 
which hackers asked for any other method to get an account, other than ‘phishing’. In addition, in 1997 
first media publication warns customers of new threat called “phishing”, also AOL cut down its direct 
access for Russian users due to increased level of fraud. In 1998, phishers started to make use of 
message boards and news groups to attack victims. From 2000 onwards, phishers started using mass-
mailers to spread phishing emails and spoofed URLs to redirect a fake website [2]. In addition to this, 
for acquiring login credentials (i.e. login-id, password, etc), key loggers became popular among the 
phishers [2].  
In 2001, as described in [11], e-gold became the first victim among the financial institutions. Phishers 
started using spam messages to spread their network. As described in [11], Buffalo spammer was 
arrested in New York in 2003 after sending 825 million spam emails and fraudulently using stolen 
identities. In 2005, Bank of America lost 1.2 million usernames and SSNs of their customers. In 2006, 
phishers targeted VoIP first time. In 2007, according to Gartner study, about 1.5 millions of US citizen 
identities got stolen. In 2008, S. Wallace received $711M for posting spam messages on walls of 
Facebook’s members. In 2011, Credit and Debit card details of more than 10M PlayStation Network 
and Sony Entertainments users are stolen and damaged approximately $1 to $2 billion making it the 
costliest cyber-hack ever. In February 2014, according to the report of 3rd Microsoft Safer security 
Index phishing caused annual losses of about $5 billions [48]. Over the past few year, phishing attacks 
have evolved into much more advanced threats beyond emails also including SMS, online social 
1954
• Bell's Journal published signalling system & process for routing telephone calls over trunk lines
1957
• 7 year blind boy Josef Engressia discovers a frequency to activate phone switches
1960
• "Signalling Systems for Control of Telephone Switching " was published with frequencies for routing codes
1964
• AT&T starts monitoring telephone calls to detect "Phone Phreaking" 
1965
• First reported vulnerability in Multies CTSS on IBM 7094, disclosing password file(founded by WD Mattews) data 
1969
• John Draper built "Blue Box" which generates the frequency to gain easier entry into AT&T systems
1972
• John Draper arrested on toll fraud charges & sentenced to five year probation
1978
• First international commercial spam was sent by DEC marketing Gary Thuerk
1982
• Ken Thompson described a security exploit that he called "Trojan Horse"
• Rich Skrenta a 15-year old high school student creates the first boot sector virus "Elk Cloner" for Apple II
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networking even online gaming [54, 55, 56]. eCrime Trends Reports of the year 2012 shows that 
Phishing attacks are increasing by 12% per year. Phishing emails are becoming an enormous threat 
everyday affecting major financial companies and clients. Researchers have given many solutions 
ranging from authentication protocols to content filtering to protect against phishing attacks but still 
the attackers are able to carry out these frauds successfully [54, 55, 56, 57]. Of course, it is easy to 
exploit humans rather than breaking into the system straightway.  
 
 
 
Figure. 6. A timeline diagram of various phishing events as described in [3, 5] 
B. Phishing Statistics Report 
 
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is the worldwide coalition of the various governments’ law-
enforcement sectors. We described the statistics of unique phishing emails and unique phishing 
websites attacks from fourth quarter 2012 to fourth quarter 2014 in Figure 7 as given in [3]. Based on 
the statistic reports and figure 8, we can conclude that the number of unique phishing websites attacks 
in any month is almost double the phishing email attacks, which were unique. Compared to number of 
unique phishing emails reported, phishing websites attacks which were unique seems to be decreased 
with time, whereas number of unique phishing emails reported seems to be less decreased in that 
period.  
1995
• US General accounting office attempts to hack DOD systems 250K times 65% of which were succesful
1996
• First Public use of the word "Phishing" linked to AOL credential theft.
1997
• First media threat warns user of new threat called "Phishing"
1998
• Phishers started using message boards and newsgroups to attack victims
2000
• Use of mass mailers to spread Phishing emails and Spoofed URLs
2001
• First Phishing attack on the financial institution E-gold
2003
• Buffalo spammers arrested for using two stoled IDs to send 825 million fraud emails 
2004
• Bank of america had 1.2 M SSNs stolen
2005
• Spear Phishing was first used
2006
• VoIP used for the first time
2007
• Gartner reported that 1.5 M americans were victims of Identity theft 
2008
• Wallace received $711M judgement
2011
• Over 200,000 Citigroup customers' data was compromised and theives stole $7.2M from credit cards
• Credit/Debit card data of 10 Sony Playstation users were stolen estimated damage was $1 to $2 billion
2013
• Red October operation attacked more than 69 countries
2015
• Hackers used IoT gadgets to send Spam emails
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Figure 7. Unique phishing email and websites attacks from January 2012 to December 2014 by APWG 
 
In Figure. 8, we described more about phishing statistics, as given in [3]. We can conclude from these 
reports that phishers uses port 80 (i.e. http protocol) in maximum cases. In addition, phishers tries to 
use target name within the phishing URI, so that the page appear legitimate at first glance, even to an 
expert user. Based on APWG reports, which is available at [3], it is clear that if any solution based on 
http protocol is able to find the target name from URL and more focused on phishing websites can be 
able to cover a wider area of phishing network. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Phishing Statistics from October 2013 to December 2014 
 
      
We also studied some statistics of phishing attacks from eCrime Trend Reports. According to [12], in 
Q4 2014, .com is the most used domain for phishing attacks with 41%, followed by .net with 7%, .org 
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with 5%, .br with 3% and IP address based with 3% (as shown in Figure. 9). Figure 10 shows the 
details of some highly targeted industry sectors as per the APWG report of 4th quarter of 2014. 
 
 
Figure 9: Statistics of phishing websites based on domain (E-crime Report 2013 Q4) 
 
 
 
Figure. 10. Statistics showing Most targeted Industries in 2014 
 
 
Phishing statistics and incidents of 2015[67-71] 
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• Google Safe Browsing mentioned in a report that between years 2014 and 2015, the number of 
malicious web pages fell down from 18,454 to 14,977 whereas the number of phishing pages 
rose up from about 24,864 to 33,571. 
• Intel security conducted a phishing related quiz online which showed that even trained security 
specialists sometimes fail to separate phishing and real web pages. 
• In a study conducted in 2015, it has been shown that an employee takes about 1 minute and 22 
seconds to open a spear phishing email. 
• About 70% of the popular IoT gadgets are vulnerable to security attacks. 
• Only 6% of the organization claim to have a incident response system and law enforcement. 
• In January 2015, three new android families were found, and about 80% of the malware attacks 
are a part of phishing scams. 
• In the year 2014, about 16% of iOS users and 12% of android users fell for phishing attacks. 
• One out of every 207 emails contain a virus, and the emails having technical information are 
most likely to be clicked open. 
 
C. Phishing Lifecycle 
 
 
There are various phases to the phishing cycle. However, there are three main phases in phishing cycle 
repeated by various phishers [1, 2, 4-9]. In first phase, the phisher explores organizations and selects 
a target and then, creates a phishing website and send numerous spam emails among the various users 
in Internet community. Second phase starts with reading of these emails. Whenever the user “bites” 
on the phish i.e. click on the link, third phase starts and user is redirected to the phishing site.  
In this section, we briefly described about the phishing campaign in which phisher uses the advantage 
of ignorance about the communication channel in common users, as described in figure 11. In mailing 
system, every email first passes through the DNS based blacklist filters. If the domain of sender is 
found in blacklist, the email is blocked before reaching the SMTP mail server. Based on structural 
properties of emails, various solutions filters email before it reaches to the user’s inbox. There are also 
various solutions available to check emails based on features of any email on client side. In case of 
phishing webpages, the links are embedded in emails sent to the user or any other advertisement. There 
are various solutions available on the client side as Internet is vast enough to control it. Some blacklist-
based applications block the website if domain falls under blacklist. Unlike the blacklist solution for 
emails that block emails before they reach the SMTP mail server, it blocks the website when browser 
of client side request for the URL mentioned in the list. Some more solutions like heuristic feature and 
visual similarities block the webpage only when the browser request for any phishing webpage [82]. 
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Figure 11. Lifecycle of phishing attacks based on phishing emails and phishing websites 
 
 
D. Motivation 
 
Phishers always take the benefit of human factors that generally ignore the critical warning messages. 
Lack of awareness about phishing attacks in society is the main reason, due to which phishing attacks 
have become so much successful. According to the fact that phishing is mainly used for financial gains, 
there are other factors such as social gains, motivate phishers to commit the crime. As discussed in 
[2,7], motivations behind these crimes are as below: 
• Theft of banking credentials – stealing of credentials such as credit card details, CVV number and 
online credentials for websites like PayPal and eBay etc. 
• Capture of personal information – personal information, such as address, telephone number are 
sold online through bids and are in constant demand.    
• Theft of trade secrets and confidential documents – here spear phishing is used to accomplish the 
task, targeting specific organizations for acquisition of proprietary information to use directly or 
to sell to interested parties. 
• Fame and notoriety – sometimes the intention behind phishing scams is not financial gain but to 
get recognition and fame among peers. 
• Exploit security holes – attackers are sometimes curious to discover vulnerabilities in existing or 
new technologies, which would help them in future to launch attacks. 
• Attack Propagation – sometimes to camouflage their location the attackers use bots etc., for 
propagation, they can use a single system within an organization for running the scam. 
 
E. Performance Evaluation 
Performance evaluation is very useful while describing the phishing literature. The efficiency of 
approaches that are developed for phishing detection are evaluated by one of the metrics given below:  
 
Suppose 𝑁" denotes total number of legitimate pages (or email) and 𝑁# denotes total number of 
phishing pages (or email). If the legitimate website is correctly identified, it is denoted by𝑁" → 𝐿. 
When a phishing website is correctly detected, it is denoted by𝑁# → 𝑃. Whereas, when the phishing 
website is detected as legitimate and the legitimate website as phishing, it is represented as 𝑁# → 𝐿 
and 𝑁" → 𝑃 respectively. Some of the metrics to measure performance of an approach are mentioned 
below: 
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a. True Positive (TP): The ratio of number of phishing pages correctly detected as phishing by 
the solution with the total number of phishing pages visited. 𝑇𝑃	 = 𝑁# → 𝑃𝑁#  
b. True Negative (TN): The ratio of number of legitimate pages correctly detected as legitimate 
by the solution with the total number of legitimate pages visited. 𝑇𝑁	 = 𝑁" → 𝐿𝑁"  
c. False Positive (FP): The ratio of number of phishing pages wrongly detected as legitimate by 
the solution with the total number of phishing pages visited. 𝐹𝑃	 = 	𝑁# → 𝐿𝑁#  
d. False Negative (FN): The ratio of number of legitimate pages wrongly detected as phishing by 
the solution with the total number of legitimate pages visited. 𝐹𝑁	 = 	𝑁" → 𝑃𝑁"  
For simplicity we can considered that ‘True’ represent the correct detection, whereas ‘False’ represent 
the wrong detection. ‘Positive’ represent that the actual page is phishing, whereas ‘Negative’ represent 
that the actual page is legitimate. However, these are not the only measures to evaluate performance. 
Some more evaluation measures given in [7, 8] are described below: 
 
e. Precision (P): The ratio of number of phishing pages correctly detected as phishing by the 
solution with the total number of phishing pages detected by the solution. The phishing pages 
detected by the solution may be actually a phishing page or a legitimate page. 𝑃 = 𝑁# → 𝑃𝑁# → 𝑃 + 𝑁# → 𝐿 
f. Recall (R): The ratio of number of phishing pages correctly detected as phishing by the  solution 
with the total number of actual phishing pages visited by the solution. It is simply the True 
Positive of any solution. 
R = TP 
g. 𝑓- Score: It is the harmonic mean between Precision and Recall. It tends to take into account 
the performance of the algorithm on common categories. 𝑓- = 2PRP + R 
h. Accuracy (ACC): The ratio of sum of correctly detected legitimate and phishing pages by the 
solution with the sum of total number of actual legitimate and phishing pages visited by the 
solution. 𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁# → 𝑃 + 𝑁" → 𝐿𝑁# + 𝑁"  
 
i. Weighted Error (WER): The ratio of sum of incorrectly detected λ times the number of 
legitimate pages and phishing pages by the solution with the actual number of phishing and 
legitimate pages visited by the solution. 𝑊𝐸𝑅 = 1 − 𝜆.𝑁" → 𝐿 + 𝑁# → 𝑃𝜆𝑁" + 𝑁#  
 
Another important category is for the evaluation of features used in email classification. The most 
commonly used metrics for this purpose are: 
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a. Entropy (E): Measures the amount of disorder or disturbance in the system. It can be 
calculated as: 𝐸 𝑆 = 	 −𝑝<𝑙𝑜𝑔@	𝑝<A<B- 		, (10)  
where, N: number of classes in the dataset, 
 S: dataset, and 
pi: probability of an email belonging to class i. 
b. Information Gain (IG): Measures decrease in the value of entropy when a particular feature 
is used. IG(S,A) is the information gain of dataset S over the attribute A and can be obtained 
as : 𝐼𝐺 𝑆, 𝐴 = 	𝐸 𝑆 			− FGH 𝐸(𝑆J)J	∈	JMNOP(Q)   , (11) 
where,  Sv: the number of attributes in S with A has the value of v, and. 
E(Sv): entropy of the subset Sv in S. 
 
 
 
III. TAXONOMY OF PHISHING ATTACKS 
 
Phishing attacks can be classified based on the mechanism by which the phisher can be able to access 
personal information of a victim. Either a phisher uses a way in which he/she frauds to victim or he/she 
uses any malicious code to access victim personal information. A phisher may fraud to any innocent 
user either by using spoofed emails or by using fake websites. Malicious code, key logger, and screen 
capture can also use to access personal information and technique is known as technical subterfuge 
phishing. A basic classification of Phishing attacks is shown in Figure. 12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Classification of Phishing attacks based on how a phisher fraud to victims 
 
A. Social Engineering 
 
Phishing
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Social engineering refers to fooling a person to accomplish certain goals, which may be malicious 
and harm the victim. These techniques basically intend to acquire access to certain system or 
getting information related to a person or a group for financial gain. During 2014, Apple was the 
most targeted brand by the phisher according to global phishing survey. Attackers sent fake emails 
to apple users which asked them to update their account details, giving a link to redirect them to 
website where they could update the data, several users ended up giving their credential on those 
fake sites [72]. As defined in [3]: 
 
“Social engineering schemes use spoofed e-mails purporting to be from legitimate businesses and 
agencies, designed to lead consumers to counterfeit websites that trick recipients into divulging 
financial data such as usernames and passwords.” The phishing based on social engineering is 
further classified based on [14-19]: 
 
I. Spoofed Emails  
a) We also called them phishing emails. These emails are not as ordinary emails, but these 
are from untrusted mail server or some pranks are used to make believe its victim that 
any trusted party sent this mail. These emails are used to convince its victim, so that 
he/she may send his/her personal information.  Email phishing can be done in any of 
the following ways: (i) concatenating some string to start or end of a legitimate domain 
to generate a fake link; (ii) the actual links are not the same as the links visible to the 
user; (iii) use bugs to redirect a link to a malicious website; (iv) exchange certain 
characters of legitimate URL with similar characters that are different to detect; (v) Use 
of Javascripts etc, to hide the address bars.Spear Phishing- A new term “spear phishing” 
has also come into picture, where the target is a specific person or organization. Spear-
phishing  is  also  being  used  against any group of people in an organization working 
at any position, “whaling” specifically targets the high-rank employees of an 
organization [64]. A spear phishing attack targeting to a specific user may leverage 
information such as his/her user name and email address to craft an email that is 
personalized to the user. This spear phishing technique will certainly improve the 
success rate of the attack and techniques that can be leveraged by an attacker to find 
contextual information [87]. In the year 2009, major organizations such as Google, 
Yahoo, Adobe and Symantec became victims of spear phishing and malware attacks by 
a group Operation Aurora attacks. 
 
 
b) Whaling- This mainly targets high profile employees of big organizations to excess 
highly confidential information. It is also called CEO fraud, here hackers use social 
engineering to phish users to give away their bank credentials employee data etc. These 
attacks are even difficult to detect as they do not use malware or fake websites. 
 
 
II. Fake Websites  
These are also known as phishing websites, they appear same as that of a legitimate site 
visually, these fake websites are used to get personal information about the victim. Generally, 
the links of the fake websites are embedded with phishing emails, advertisements or within 
crack of licenced software. Phisher always try his best to make visual appearance and URI 
pattern similar to the victim site.  
 
B. Technical Subterfuge 
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A phisher not just depend only on the social engineering schemes to theft personal information. 
Technical subterfuge is another popular way to fraud in which a phisher send some malicious code 
either attached with emails, or with websites, or with some self-executable code (generally crack 
of any software). As defined in [3]: 
 
“Technical subterfuge schemes plant crime-ware onto PCs to steal credentials directly, often using 
systems to intercept consumers online account user names and passwords and to corrupt local 
navigational infrastructures to misdirect consumers to counterfeit websites.” The phishing based 
on technical subterfuge is further classified based on [14-19]: 
 
a) Cross-Site Scripting – XSS is a vulnerability due to weak security techniques in web 
applications. To bypass the access control, attacker may be used cross-site scripting 
vulnerability. XSS happened when dynamic web page displayed input without properly 
validate. This allows attacker to install malicious JavaScript into generated page that is viewed 
on victim side. After this, it is very easy to transfer login credential to the attacker and misuse 
for financial gain or any other purpose. XSS can influence any site that allows the user to enter 
data. 
b) Session Hijacking – Session hijacking is a common and serious thread in WLAN. This is also 
known as cookies hijacking. In this attack, session key is hijacked with the help of denial of 
service attack to steal the identity and access the unauthorised resources. An attacker force 
mobile station to terminate its connection with any particular access point. It have been done 
by disassociate the source MAC address of current access point and spoofed the access point 
to attacker. 
c) Malware Phishing – In malware based phishing, malware is used to store credentials in victim 
computer and send it to the owner i.e. the phisher. 
d) DNS Poisoning – In DNS poisoning attacks the phisher has a fake DNS server and somehow 
tempts the client to communicate with it, and once the victim connects they are directed to 
malicious webpages or might install malware into their systems.  
e) Key/Screen Loggers- Key loggers are very difficult to detect and now with screen logging 
software the virtual keyboards have no utility at all. These capture the screen snapshots and 
mouse movements which are sent to the phisher who is at a remote location.  
 
IV. TAXONOMY OF DEFENSE MECHANISHMS 
 
We classified various phishing detection and protection schemes based on some classifications 
describe in [14-19]. One of the classifications is used to classify various available solutions based on 
email filtering schemes [19] and other classification is used to classify various available solutions 
based on detecting phishing websites [16-18]. In email filtering classification, there are some schemes 
like network based protection that is based on blacklist schemes, heuristic schemes in which phishing 
emails either detect on server side or on client side, are based on some features which is introduced by 
phisher to redirect victim to phishing websites or other features used to fool victim. In phishing 
websites detections, some extensions or toolbars are used with web-browser to protect from phishing 
attack. There are both server side (CANTINA, PILFER etc.) and client side solutions (balcklisting and 
whitelisting) available in email based filtering method, but during our literature survey, we only found 
client side solutions in websites detection schemes. 
 
 
A. User Education 
 
Why do people fall for phishing?: Dhamija, et al. [91] conducted a laboratory-based study showing 
twenty-two participants to twenty websites, asking them to differentiate phishing website from 
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legitimate ones. Authors revealed that that participants made mistakes on the test 40% of the time. 
Furthermore, authors noted that 23% of their participants missed out all 
  
cues in the web browser address bar and status bar as well as all security indicators. Nevertheless, to 
date, a considerable amount of literature work has been discussed that “humans’ incapability to interact 
with the systems” is one of major reasons why people still fall for phishing attacks [92, 59, 60, 61, 62, 
93]  
 
It is vital to state that users’ perception of such phishing threats may encourage users to prevent from 
potential vulnerabilities. Downs, et al [92] have employed a role-playing study aiming at understanding 
why people fall for phishing emails and what cues they look for to prevent such attacks. The results 
revealed two key things. First, even though people are aware of phishing attacks, they do not feel 
potential vulnerabilities or strategies to trace phishing attacks. Second, while people can protect 
themselves from known risks, they also have difficulties of understanding their known to unfamiliar 
risks. Wu, et al. [93] stressed that most users do not understand how phishing works or how 
sophisticated such attacks can be. One could argue this would be the people’s lack of phishing threat 
perception. 
Wu, et al [93] empirically investigated three simulated anti-phishing toolbars to determine how they 
were effective at securing participants from visiting fraudulent websites. Their study revealed that 
many participants ignored passive toolbar security indicators and instead used the website’s content to 
decide whether or not it is a phishing website. In some cases, participants did not notice warning signals 
and in other cases they assumed warnings were not valid though they noticed them. Perhaps, one can 
argue people struggle to interact with toolbars due to a lack of usability. Therefore, it is worth 
understanding to conduct usability studies to emphasis how users interact with security toolbars. 
Previous research has been shown that both academic and government organizations have made a 
significant effort to deliver end-user education to enable public understanding of the importance of 
cyber security, especially in anti-phishing context [94]. The Anti-Phishing Work Group (APWG) [3] 
is a non-profit organisation working to provide anti-phishing education to improve the public 
understanding of computer security. They cover number of areas: 1) What a phishing threat is ? 2) 
How can it be severe? 3) What is the usefulness of having a safeguarding measure? 4) Where and how 
to report a suspected phishing email or website? and 5) Anti-Phishing education to thwart phishing 
attacks. The US Computer Emergency Readiness Team also offers people free advice on its website 
about common cyber security breaches for computer users who have a limited computer literacy. 
 
While a great deal of efforts have been contributed to resolve the phishing issue by prevention and 
detection of phishing techniques related to emails, URLs and web sites, little research has been done 
in the area of end-user education to protect themselves from phishing threats [94]. Therefore, further 
research needs to aim at anti-phishing education to protect people from phishing attacks. 
 
B. Protection from Phishing Emails 
 
Phishing email message transportation is shown in Figure 13. The framework to detect phishing emails 
from a set of emails in real time situations is present between Message Transfer Agent (MTA) and 
Mail User Agent (MUA) to stop phishing email before reaching the victim’s inbox. 
 
MTA (Message Transfer Agent): acts as mail carrier and storage location. 
MUA (Mail User Agent): application that retrieves emails such as “MS Outlook”. 
MDA (message delivery agents): it is the mailbox, it saves messages until the user sees them. 
Phisher: person or group with malicious intentions targeting a victim. 
Victim:  user who may fall for the phishing email and become the target of Phisher.  
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                                   Figure 13  Phishing email message transportation 
 
An overview of email data parts is shown in figure 14 [49]. 
 
Figure 14: An overview of email data parts [49] 
 
Phishing email Features: 
The most effective features are extracted by analyzing data parts C, and D of an email message (as 
shown in Figure 14). A generally used approach in extracting features found in A and B is by the use 
of blacklists [49]. The groups of most effective features of an email are discussed in Table I. 
 
Table I. Most effective features of an Email 
Group 
Features 
No Features abbreviation of Features 
External 
features 
1 Spam features (included 50 sub-features) Spamfeatures 
 
 
 
Body-based 
features 
 
 
 
2 HTML e-mail body_html 
3 Body of Multi part body_multipart 
4 Verify your account phrase body_Verifyphrase 
5 “OnClick” JavaScript event body_JSonclick 
6 Code of JavaScript to Change the status bar body_JSchangebar 
7 Code of Java script body_javascript 
8 Code of Java script to open popup windows body_JSpopup 
9 Forms in email body body_forms 
IP Source 1.1.1.1:IP Destination:2.2.2.2
TCP Source 66666;TCP Destination port:25
EHLO mx:example.com
MAIL FROM :<support@example.com>
RECP TO:<Client@gmail.com>
DATA
From:<support@example.com>
To:<Client@gmail.com>
Subject: Account Expired!
Dear Client,
Your account is expired .To activate,
Login:
Http://Phishsite.com/Active.php
Regards,
Example Inc. Technical support
A
B
C
D
TCP/IP 
Header
SMTP
Envelope
SMTP
Data
RF
C8
22
He
ade
r
RF
C8
22
Bo
dy
SM
TP
 M
ail
 O
bje
ct
(TC
P p
ayl
oad
)
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10 Ratio of the number of words to the number of 
Characters 
body richness 
 
 
 
URL-based 
Features 
 
 
 
 
11 html-links url_htmllink 
12 Number of dots in a link url_nodots 
13 Non matching between target and text of urls url_ TarDiflink 
14 URL IP address url_ip 
15 Image links url_imagelink 
16 URL bag of word links url_bagword 
17 URL has two domains url_twodomain 
18 Non-standard port in the URL url_nonstport 
19 URL containing hexadecimal characters or @ symbol url_hexorat 
 
Header 
based 
Features 
 
20 Subject replay word sub_replay 
21 Difference between the sender domain from the 
domain of the embedded links 
Diffsenlindom 
22 Subject (bank, verify, debit) sub_words 
23 Sender e-mail address uses different replay address Sendiffreplyto 
24 Total number of words in the subject line subj noWords 
25 Total number of characters in the email’s subject subj noCharacters 
Sender 
based 
Features 
26 Total number of words in the send field send noWords 
27 Total number of characters send noCharacters 
28 difference between the sender’s domain and the 
reply-to domain 
send diffSenderReplyTo 
29 sender’s domain is different from the email’s modal 
domain 
send nonModalSenderDomain 
 
Table I shows four groups of features: External Features (group 1), Body-based features (group 2), 
URL based Features (group 3) and Features Header (group 4). Phishing emails are the traditional and 
one of the common ways for phishing frauds. Users through Mail User Agent (MUA) transfer any 
phishing mail from Mail Transfer Agent (MTA), which transferred email to Mail Delivery Agents 
(MDA), and then finally received. The Figure. 15 shows the process of phishing email being 
transferred to a computer network [19]. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Various phases in phishing email attack 
 
Based on life cycle of phishing email, as discussed in [10] phishing emails are classifying into the 
following categories. 
 
a. Network level protection 
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Implementation of network level protection restricts a set domains or IP addresses to enter in a 
network. It blocks the communication from those systems, which are marked or identified as 
spammers or phishers. The network level protection is also known as ‘blacklist filters’, because it 
based on the mechanism in which some particular range of IP addresses or domain name listed as 
blacklist and not allowing any communication from the list. Some example of this filter schemes 
as given below: 
 
i. Anti-Spam filters 
The anti-spam techniques [19] can determine the origin of emails and decrease the attacks to 
great extent. Emails are sent in bulk to mark potential victims; these emails contain fake sender 
details and a false route information etc. Due to the vulnerability that exist in SMTP protocol 
all of this is possible. Emails to seem to be coming from a genuine organization and phishers 
are able disguise their actual identities. 
 
ii. DNS-Based Blacklist 
The blacklist approaches are reactive in nature requiring attention from Internet Service 
Providers to continuously update the list by monitoring the network traffic. The DNS-based 
blacklists [20] make use of DNS protocol. However, a server optimized to handle large DNS 
resource records is required or else other service handling DNSBLs may face several 
limitations in terms of performance and speed. However, this technique has also been cracked 
by the attackers by acquiring access to a legitimate system or using different IP addresses. 
 
b. Authentication 
 
User and server authentication approaches check whether the attacker is not pretending to be a 
valid sender of an email or a resource request, it increases the security at both server and user level. 
At user level authentication is ensured by use of passwords, but it is evident in past that passwords 
can be cracked by the phishers [21]. Authentication at domain level [22] is ensured by the service 
provider. Microsoft Sender ID [21] and Yahoo based Domain Key [22] provides some examples 
of domain level authentications. Email level authentication [23] is also used to authenticate email 
based on domain name and hash of password as digital signature. Most of the users do not use 
email authentication and that became one of the biggest drawback. 
 
c. Feature based email classification 
 
A very common strategy behind using phishing emails is to embed a link clicking on which leds 
the user to a fake webpage. The phishing email used email structure with embedded URI to ask the 
user to disclose confidential data. However, these phishing emails are extracted by using some 
features, which can easily detect by using previous knowledge as phisher repeat some pattern to 
fool their victims by disturbing the email feature. 
 
i. Link features 
A hyperlink structure is as : <a href=“URI”>“Visual Text”<\a>, where URI is the actual 
address of link of “Visual Text.” URI contents are not displayed in web browser, but “Visual 
Text.” Phisher uses this fact in ‘bait’ e-mails to redirect victim to a phishing websites. 
LinkGuard algorithm [24], examines the actual and visual link for any differences. It compares 
the actual DNS and the DNS visible, if they are not similar then website is definitely phishing. 
Use of IP address directly also signal that the website might be phishing, but it is not definite, 
if the destination information is missing actual DNS is examined,  in case of encoded links, 
decoding is done followed by recursive execution of LinkGaurd.  
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ii. Structural features 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [25] which is deployed as server site to classify emails before 
they reach the client is the most commonly used classification mechanism for phishing emails. 
However, the experimental results in this work were not sufficient for large data, i.e. they used 
only 25 features to distinguish these email which were selected using simulated annealing.  
 
iii. Word list features 
This method is used to filters phishing emails that is applied either certain part or the whole 
email, the input here is a group of words without any sequence. The main approach of the 
classification is based on the machine-learning algorithm. 
    This model has various shortcomings, it requires a large number of features, it has high 
complexity in terms of time and memory, it is also not able to detect zero-day attacks. 
i) k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) - Gansterer proposed k-NN classifier [26] classifies 
phishing emails based on k-nearest training input where training data is chosen using a 
predefined similarity function. 
ii) Naive bays classifiers – it uses Bayes theorem to perform probabilistic classification, it 
is mostly used for text classification and keyword filtering. The features used for Naïve 
Bayes classifier are statistically independent to maintain the accuracy. 
 
d. Comparison of existing solutions 
Comparisons of various existing solutions for Phishing Website detection is shown in Table II. 
 
Table II. Comparisons of various existing solutions for Phishing emails 
Reference Solution Utility Approach Limitation/ 
Remarks 
DNSBL Information 
[20] 
DNS-based 
blacklist 
In anti-spam 
filters 
Blacklist a range of IP 
address and domain 
names 
Zero-day phishing 
Lyon et. al., 2006 
[21] 
Sender ID In Microsoft 
Sender ID 
Domain level 
authentication is used by 
sending Sender ID 
Both side must use the 
same technology 
Delany et. al., 2007 
[22] 
Domain Key In Yahoo Domain 
Key 
Domain level 
authentication is used by 
sending Domain Key 
Both side must use the 
same technology 
B. Adida, et. al., 
2005 [23] 
Email 
authentication 
Gmail, Hotmail, 
Yahoo 
Authenticate by password 
hashing with domain 
name 
Most user do not use 
email authentication 
J. Chen, et. al., 2006 
[24] 
LinkGuard 
algorithm 
In Windows it 
check all mailing 
application 
Find the similarities 
between domain of actual 
and visual links 
Check only for emails 
and higher false 
positive rate 
M. Chandrasekaran, 
et. al., 2006 [25] 
SVM based 
structural 
properties 
Check emails 
before it reach to 
inbox 
Implemented between 
MTA and MUA using 
SVM classifier 
Use a very small set of 
features (25 only) 
W. N. Gansterer, et. 
al., 2009 [26] 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
Rank emails in 
Ham, Spam and 
Phishing 
Detect emails based on 
similarities in k-sample 
phishing emails 
High false positive 
rate then the spam 
filters 
Fette, Sadeh et al. 
[98] 
 
PILFERS 
 
Uses 10 features 
including Spam 
Assasin output. 
 
Random forest and 
Support vector machine 
(SVMs) 
for classification 
Large amount of 
emails are 
misclassified. 
Bazarganigilani [42] Based ontology 
concept  and a set 
of heuristics 
 
 The working is divided in 
5 steps and uses 
Information Gain (IG), 
Naïve Bayes classifier 
Low accuracy of 
classification. 
20 
	
Bergholz et al.[14] Uses Dynamic 
Markov Models 
Study statistical 
filtering of the 
phishing 
Emails 
Dynamic markov chains 
are used to train the 
classifier on feature set. 
 
High time and storage 
complexity. 
 
Kumarguru et. al 
[79-81] 
User Education 
based Approach 
Assess the 
effectiveness of 
training materials , 
oniline tests, 
embedded training 
approaches etc., 
Use of short training 
materials will enable 
users to read,  immediate 
training after person 
becomes a phishing 
victim, 
Participants were more 
educated than the 
average Intenet users. 
MP-Shield [97] Blacklist and Data 
minig based 
approach 
Detects phishing 
activites in android 
based devices 
Uses google balcklist API 
to extract attributes from 
network traffic and then 
performs classification 
There is no method for 
the updation of the 
model to increase it’s 
knowledge 
Park et. al [98] Based ontology 
concept   
the syntactic 
similarity for 
sentences, and the 
subject and object 
of verb 
comparison 
to determine the hidden 
intention of email from 
the computer perspective 
so that machines could 
more accurately detect 
phishing emails 
High complexity 
Tayal et. al [99] Data minig based 
approach 
Particle 
Swarm 
Optimization 
trained 
Classification 
Association Rule 
Mining 
a new rule pruning 
scheme in order to reduce 
the number of rules and 
increasing the 
generalization aspect of 
the classifier 
High time and storage 
complexity 
PhishWHO [100] difference 
between the target 
and actual 
identities of a 
webpage 
Phishing webpage 
detection via 
identity keywords 
extraction and 
target domain 
name finder 
Exploit URL patterns 
based on the proposed N-
gram model to extract 
identity keywords 
Cannot address visual 
cloning 
 
C. Protection from Phishing Websites 
 
A fake website seems to be similar with any legitimate websites in look and design. The URL pattern 
of any fake page also seems to be similar in first glance. Phishers try their best in both look and feel 
as well as in URL pattern so that more and more victim attract toward their fake page without knowing 
that they are under phishing attacks. As whole Internet, cannot be control from server side, so solutions 
available to detect these fake pages are only for the client side. Based on these characteristics, we 
classified many solutions for phishing website [16-18], under the following categories: 
 
 
 
a. Blacklist and Whitelist 
 
Blacklists consists of a list phishing URLs and IP addresses detected in the past, which are updated 
in certain intervals, whereas, whitelist is collection legitimate addresses and URLs. They do not 
provide security against zero-day attacks, as new address or site cannot be detected by these 
blacklists. Whitelists generally used to reduce ‘false positive’ rates. However, blacklist has lower 
FP rates then heuristic. 
 
i. Google Safe Browsing API 
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Google Safe Browsing API [27] allows the user application to verify if a given URL is 
blacklisted or not. Although the protocol is still experimental, various browsers including 
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox use it. Google provides the current implementation of the 
protocol, and which has two blacklists namely ‘goog-phish-shavar’ (phishing) and ‘goog-
malware-shavar’ (malware). 
 
Google Safe Browsing API allows the client side applications to check if a URL is blacklisted 
from a list which is continuously updated by Google. Although the protocol is still 
experimental, various browsers use it. The list maintained at the client side and is updated 
periodically; however, if URL is changed even a little bit from the blacklisted URL would 
result in no match. 
 
ii. PhishNet: Predictive Blacklisting 
PhishNet [28] solves the problem of exact matching (if a URL is slightly changed version of 
blacklisted one then it remains undetected). It generates almost all possible variants of a URL 
using five different variation heuristics, which are:  
i) Replace Top Level Domains (TLD) 
ii) Directory structure similarity 
iii) IP address equivalence 
iv) Query string substitution 
v) Brand name equivalence 
 
iii. Automated Individual White-List 
Automated Individual White-List (AIWL) [29] keeps a list of legitimate websites where users 
have given their sensitive information which are called trusted Login User Interfaces (LUIs) 
features. A warning is generated if credentials are submitted to any untrusted webpages not on 
the whitelist. Ye et al., proposed an approach in which a feature vector for successful and failed 
login attempts based on the AIWL is given to Naïve Bayes classifier which construct a model, 
which calculates probabilities of future attempts of login. The attempt is predicted to be 
successful if the probability is higher than a predefined threshold. 
 
b. Heuristic Solutions 
 
Heuristics refer to set of rules based on previous results and experiences, to solve a problem or 
learning purposes. The solutions based on heuristics are not necessarily optimal, but the results are 
near optimal and ease the decision making process. 
 
Phishing detection based on heuristics are found to be effective in case of zero-day phishing 
attacks. These are based on the fact gathered from real time phishing attacks; however, it has the 
risk of high false positives, but gives better results than blacklist based approaches. However, 
Browsers such as, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer etc., use heuristic based solution for phishing 
detection. 
 
i. SpoofGuard 
SpoofGuard [30] is browser plug for Internet Explorer in developed by Stanford university. It 
uses a set of heuristics to detect anomalies in the webpage content. It detects phishing scams 
based on HTTP. It defines a certain threshold value and if the results of the heuristics cross the 
threshold level a warning is given to the user. SpoofGuard checks if the URL is similar to a 
whitelisted one. Then it detects for the presence of a hidden attribute in the URL. If the URL 
in the text attribute is different from the actual one then the site malicious. It has traffic indicator 
system, which calculates the threat level by navigating the site. The passwords fields if present 
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also increase the level of threat (though they are mostly harmless) as they might copy a login 
form.  
 
ii. Collaborative Intrusion Detection 
In CIDS [31], untrusted data is exchanged between different Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs). Each CIDS examines DNS cache to retrieve high resource records zones and low Time-
to-live values. This list is sent to a global CIDS. All the systems then monitor the addresses on 
that list and detect the infected ones. The detection of origin of the malicious content can be 
done by analyzing incoming and outgoing connection of suspicious IP address. But this 
approach is not implemented due to complexity regarding examining the fast flux attacks. 
     
iii. PhishGuard: A Browser Plug-in 
Phishguard [32] is a heuristic based approach, which performs phishing detection based on 
HTTP authentications. It is based on the fact that phishing sites only store the credentials for 
future use and do not verify them. PhishGuard starts it test when web page requires user 
credentials. It sends the same user ID but a different password to the pages, if the response is 
HTTP 200 then the page is phishing. In case of HTTP 401 response, either it is wrong password 
error or the website is blindly signaling failed authentication. Although there is a fair chance 
of the site being legitimate, the final decision is made based on the hash of the password. The 
site is regarded as phishing if it already has hash value, else it is legitimate and the user is 
requested to re-enter the password. 
 
iv. CANTINA: A Content-Based Approach 
CANTINA [33] is a toolbar that examines webpage content for phishing detection by 
calculating Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) for each term on the 
webpage, the top n terms with highest values are then used to represent that document. They 
are given as search query in of a search engine, and domains of the first n entries are stored. If 
the webpage is one of these entries then it is considered to be legitimate else not. The following 
set of heuristics is used to lower the false positives: 
(i) A domain more than 12 months old is likely to be legitimate. 
(ii) Presence of – or @ in the linkor URL indicates page is phishing. 
(iii) Presence of more than five ‘.’ Indicates page is phishing. 
(iv) Embedded HTML forms indicate page is phishing. 
 
c. Visual Similarities 
 
One of the important properties, which is maintained by almost every phishers, so that the victim 
cannot easily distinguish between a fake page and a trusted target page. If any fake page is not 
similar in visual appearance then there is very less chance to make fool any victim easily. Visual 
appearance is one of the things, which any person noted first compare to any other things like URI 
or SSL certification or https protocol in address bar. Based on these properties, researcher also 
proposed their solutions as given below: 
 
i. Visual Similarity Based Phishing Detection 
Visual Similarity Based Phishing Detection (VSBPD) [34] detects when a user is giving any  
information to an untrusted webpage. It keeps a check on the forms filled by the user, it looks for 
the similarities of text and images embedded on the page. It also stores user credentials and where 
they are to be sent. If the website is not on the trusted list, the processes is interrupted and a 
warning is generated. The warning is generally raised when there is similarity between two pages, 
in case both of them require same information, however it is less likely for any of these websites 
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to be fake if they not similar in appearance. This approach is inspired by Anti-Phish (plug-in) 
and DOMAntiPhish (browser extension). 
 
 
ii. BaitAlarm 
According to [35], the increase in similarity between phishing and legitimate page increase the 
chance of user falling for that phishing scam. Thus, phisher always try to make fake pages that 
have very subtle differences from the target page. They use CSS technology to maintain the 
consistency of the page.  
 
The BaitAlarm consists of three components: Pre-Processor, Layout Monitor, and Network 
Library. Pre-Processor extract the layout of any new loaded page, and when user enter 
credentials in this page, browser hold this page and the layout information is sent to Layout 
Monitor. When Layout Monitor gets these information then comparison-unit extract CSS from 
page and check Network Library (maintain user history and table of victim pages) for the victim 
pages comparison-unit. Similarity score is calculated between targets and suspect page, and if 
score is found less than present threshold, the page is innocent, otherwise found a phishing 
page.  
 
d. Miscellaneous Solution 
 
There are various solutions present, which cannot classify among any of the above categories. 
These solutions can categories in miscellaneous solutions, as these solutions are not recent. 
However, these solutions have the historical impact as they came with evolution in the Internet 
technologies. Now a day, these solutions either embedded within the browser itself or used by 
various financial websites to overcome cyber-crime’s problems. These solutions are described 
below: 
 
i. TrustBar 
TrustBar [36] monitors the top portion of browser window that has logos and graphical icons. 
It must be present for every window in the browser so that attacks in which a fake site hide 
browser indicators or exchange them with other indicators are detected and prevented.  
 
ii. Dynamic Security Skin 
It is an extension for Mozilla browser. It requires Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol to 
authenticate Webpages. This extension has a trusted window for entering username and 
password; it deploys images to create a reliable path between the window and user to prevent 
any fake webpage and text field entries [37].     
 
e. Comparison of existing solutions 
Comparisons of various existing solutions for Phishing Website detection is shown in Table III. 
 
 
Table III. Comparison of existing Phishing website solutions 
Reference Solution Utility Approach Limitation/Remark 
Google 
Developer 
[27] 
Google safe 
browsing API 
Chrome, 
Firefox, etc. 
Provide a blacklist and 
when any hit occur, 
browser block the page 
Not able to detect Zero-day 
phishing and when IP change 
P. Prakash, et. 
al. (2010) [28] 
PhishNet Predictive 
blacklist 
Remove the exact match 
limitation of blacklist by 
various techniques 
Not able to detect Zero-day 
phishing 
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W. Han, et. al. 
(2012) [29] 
AIWL Tool to 
maintain 
individual 
whitelist 
User maintained their 
own individual whitelist 
& list of features of these 
legitimate webpages 
AIWL warn whenever any 
information is sent to any other 
page then in the list 
N. Chou, et. 
al. (2004) [30] 
SpoofGuard Internet 
Explorer plug-
in 
It detect spoofed pages 
based on URIs with the 
help of certain rules 
If URIs are not as defined in 
rules, it cannot detect it 
Y. Wu, et. al., 
(2003) [31] 
CIDS Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
Exchange data among 
IDS globally 
Not implemented yet 
Y. Joshi, et. 
al. (2008) [32] 
PhishGuard A browser 
plug-in 
A phishing website don’t 
respond correctly while 
asking of credentials 
Credentials theft if phishing 
website reply unauthorised 
Y. Zhang, et. 
al. (2007) [33] 
CANTINA Internet 
Explorer 
toolbar 
Search top TF-IDF in 
search engine and find 
current URI in top list 
Higher false positive rate when 
TF of any other term is high 
E. Medvet, et. 
al. (2008) [34] 
Visual Similarity 
based Phishing 
Detection 
Approach to 
detect phishing 
Find similarities based on 
text pieces, image 
embedded and overall 
visual appearance 
Not distinguish if text pieces are 
replace with image of same 
appearance 
J. Mao, et. al. 
(2013) [35] 
BaitAlarm Google 
Chrome 
Compare CSS of two 
websites, where first is 
victim and second is 
phished 
Selection of victim site is 
manually, which is not feasible 
in practical 
Herzberg, et. 
al. (2004) [36] 
TrustBar Secure user 
interface add-
on to browsers 
Identify SSL certificate 
and shown in browser 
Implemented in browser itself 
and not used separately 
R. Dhamija, 
et. al. (2005) 
[37] 
Dynamic Security 
Skin 
Extension for 
Mozilla 
Browser 
Generate unique ‘skin’ 
for each user and each 
transaction 
Depend on human, whether or 
not he/she understand the ‘skin’ 
Chen, et. al. 
(2010) [38] 
Normalized 
Compression 
Distance 
Approach to 
detect phishing 
Website attacks 
Used the concept of 
Gestalt theory and super 
signals to treat webpages 
as indivisible 
Not robust when alter to web 
pages e.g. image colour, 
relocation of objects and text 
content 
Gastellier -
Prevost, et. al. 
(2011) [39] 
Phishark Anti-phishing 
toolbar 
Define 20 heuristics for 
detecting phishing 
webpages 
Not robust when alter to web 
pages and need to add more 
heuristics for detecting phishing 
webpages 
Moghimi et. 
al (2016) 
[101] 
Rule-based 
phishing 
detection method 
PhishDetector 
extension 
two feature sets to 
determine the webpage 
identity, a rule-based 
method by extracting the 
hidden knowledge from 
our model 
not entirely reliable in detecting 
phishing attacks 
 
Solanki et, al. 
(2016) [102] 
Heuristic Based 
Approach 
Approach to 
detect phishing 
Website attacks 
extract the features then 
apply this features to 
machine learning 
techniques it will identify 
website are phished or 
legitimate 
heuristic evaluation on an 
interface is minimal due to 
organizational constraints. 
 
V. PHISHING AND INTERNET OF THINGS 
 
The IoT architecture which has been predicted since last few years is now changing our old lives 
fundamentally by being a part of our daily tasks. Devices are made to be smart and connected to the 
Internet. IoT is everywhere from our homes, schools vehicles to our bodies [73]. Although it provides 
a radical prospect of making our lives more comfortable, the security professionals are trying to come 
up with solutions to cope up with the threats these devices are vulnerable against. These threats are far 
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wider in the IoT scenario and with its growth the threats will grow too. In a highly connected 
environment the security threats can target organization, governments or common people and can 
result privacy exploitation or data thefts and so on [52]. SANS institute reports stated that in first half 
of 2015 Phishing attacks resulted into 37% intrusions in IT organizations [53]. The attackers basically 
use emails to lure the victims into falling for these attacks. These emails might have links to some 
malicious webpages; in general, these are available only for few hours, thus reducing the significance 
of blacklists and other heuristic approaches. 
In addition to these types of attacks and their defenses in the current scenario some newest areas also 
require protection from phishing attacks and IoT is one of them. The IoT enabled gadgets and sensors 
have become another easy medium for the hackers. The attacks on IoT gadgets started to make 
headlines in January 2015, the security provider Proofpoint revealed a security attacks in which spam 
emails were sent three times a day in bulk and 25% devices hosting them were televisions and 
refrigerators alongwith routers [74]. This may be a wake-up call for the sectors which are based on 
developing IoT thingbots. In these cases, we cannot blame the user for ignorance as a phishing attack 
can be successful only if all the eight layers of security have been compromised, thus we need to make 
sure that these attacks get blocked at the initial levels. In the IoT the security is so weak that the hacker 
are able to use the software in the thingbots for relaying malicious emails without even sending a virus 
or Trojan, such devices can be easily used for DDos attacks without the user knowing it as it will not 
at all effect the devices functionality. And the only way to make these devices infection free is to take 
them offline regularly and update their software [75].  
The IoT devices also are need are needed to be brought offline from time to time and updated as it the 
only way to disconnect it if it has become a part of botnet etc. The upgradation of devices can also be 
done from a remote server but it needs to be secured from intrusion. In a wireless sensor network the 
upgradation of nodes requires a secure authentication protocol to check each update received and detect 
any malware code [76].    In the year 2013, 20 billion devices were connected to Internet and this 
number will increase to 32 billion by the year 2020. Smart thing are the future and everyone is 
appreciating it but these devices are also making the job of attackers easy. Proofpoint showed in survey 
that during two weeks more than 100, 000 gadgets were compromised to send over 750,000 malicious 
emails [50]. 
Today an object mainly communicates with another object who is in the same application system, but 
there's no doubt that the technical future is connecting every application system and with the growth 
of the Internet of Things the communication between different systems will become more and more 
frequent for the collaboration. But as the lack of global standards, they may have used different 
standards and technologies, so the interoperability is a problem. Only if we can solve the 
interoperability problem we can have the Internet of Things with better connectivity. Some researchers 
[73] have come up with a solution that is addition of a Coordination Layer into the Internet of Things' 
architecture design. The coordination layer responses to process the structure of packages from 
different application systems and reassemble them to a unified structure which can be identified and 
processed by every application system. Of course, if the standards of the Internet of Things are 
completed then the systems which based on the standards will have no problem in interoperability. 
To secure the IoT devices from such attacks we have designed a simple algorithm for detection of such 
email traffic to secure the household devices. The purpose of spam emails is mainly advertising 
whereas phishing emails always have some criminal intent. Sometimes even legitimate emails are 
classified as spams. Consider a situation that a user is browsing through his/her spam folder and 
encounters an email that seems to be fine but is a phishing email, and being unaware he/she ends up 
giving his/her credentials or installing a malware. This gives rise to a need of filtering phishing emails 
so that the user is warned not to open those mails.  
Many security approaches have been proposed to secure IoT environment, but there are no such 
approaches for the detection of spam and phishing emails. Most of the approaches use encryption. But, 
these devices are not protected by anti-spam or anti-virus software, thus the IoT attacks cannot be 
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resolved at the source site. Thus, the attacks on these devices are highly distributed in nature which 
results in malicious emails successfully reaching inboxes [50, 76]. 
 
 
VI. CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
In the literature survey, various solutions to control phishing attacks have been given however, we 
found that there is no solution which we can say ‘bullet of silver’ against phishing. With time, phishing 
is becoming a more common measure to commit e-crime. Every time, when researchers come up with 
any idea to detect and prevent phishing, phishers change their attack strategy by exploiting 
vulnerabilities found in the current solution. Therefore, we can say that, it is a race condition between 
phishers and researchers. 
 
We have already discussed that the phishing scams can be run either by malware or social engineering 
which refers to the use of either fake web pages or emails [54, 55]. Thus, there are many solutions are 
available to detect these emails and websites. To control phishing emails successfully, there were 
various solutions proposed as discussed in [19-26]. Similarly, to control phishing websites attacks, 
there were also various solutions proposed in [16-18, 27-39]. Phishing email is not the only way to 
fraud, but phishers also uses fake websites and phishing emails have also the link of fake websites. 
Phishing websites found more harmful as compare to phishing email, as many of phishing emails are 
filter before receiving by user inbox and filtered mail found under the spam mail. Any educated user 
can easily neglect these filtered spam mail if filtered correctly. 
 
DNS-based Blacklist (DNSBL) [20] deploy the DNS protocol to control phishing emails. But due to 
large number of blacklisted a server faces constraints in terms of resource and performance, if it is not 
optimal for handling large number of DNS records. The blacklists are required to be updated 
periodically which requires an interactive behavior and the attackers take advantage of it if they have 
access to a legitimate PC or by changing IP addresses. In addition, it is unable to prevent from ‘zero-
day’ phishing, i.e. initial victims cannot protect from phishing. 
   
Spam Filtering techniques used at server side are also not very effective in case of phishing emails, as 
they perform classification on the appearance of certain words or phrases, if phisher changes in its 
statistics of phishing attacks, i.e. if there is solution present in server-side, which based on bag-of-
words, then phisher have to avoid only these words and then rest is easy as ‘piece-of-cake’. 
 
User and server authentication approaches check whether the attacker is not pretending to be a valid 
sender of an email or a resource request, it increases the security at both server and user level. At user 
level authentication is ensured by use of passwords, but it is evident in past that passwords can be 
cracked by the phishers [21]. Authentication at domain level [22] is ensured by the service provider. 
Email level authentication [23], is also used to authenticate email based on domain name and hash of 
password as digital signature. Most of the users do not use email authentication and that became one 
of the biggest drawback. 
 
Spoofed hyperlinks in the phishing mails are very common feature. LinkGuard algorithm [24], 
examines the actual and visual link for any differences. Support Vector Machine (SVM) [25] which is 
deployed as server site to classify emails before they reach the client is the most commonly used 
classification mechanism for phishing emails. However, the experimental results in this work were not 
sufficient for large data, i.e. they used only 25 features to distinguish these email. 
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Google Safe Browsing API [27] allows the client side applications to check if a URL is blacklisted 
from a list which is continuously updated by Google. Although the protocol is still experimental, 
various browsers use it. The list maintained at the client side and is updated periodically; however, if 
URL is changed even a little bit from the blacklisted URL would result in no match. PhishNet [28] 
addresses the exact match limitation found in blacklists. As life of these, phishing attacks are very less, 
a large amount of data is consumed to store these blacklisted URIs and domain, which have no use in 
near future. In addition, the complexity of comparing every URI with blacklist data is very high. Most 
common vulnerability of blacklist schemes are that the security still compromises as phisher still run 
the site by just changing the IP address or by using bots to spoof the domain. 
 
After blacklist scheme, some heuristic scheme proposed to detect phishing. Unlike blacklist detection 
technique, heuristic techniques can identify ‘zero-day’ attacks. But these schemes have large number 
of ‘false positive’ then blacklist schemes. Due to more advanced and complex scams it is difficult to 
design heuristics without false positives. These scheme lesser number of updates as compared to 
blacklisting and whitelisting approaches but they have high time complexity. 
 
Visual based similarity, on the other hand is appropriate scheme to detect any website as phishing. To 
do so, phisher always use visual similarity with the target website. Visual Similarity Based Phishing 
Detection (VSBPD) [34] gives a warning to user whenever he tries gives his credentials to an untrusted 
website. It checks the visual appearance of a page including images and font etc., and also remembers 
the details user is giving to a page and where it is to be sent. 
 
BaitAlarm [35] is comparatively more efficient as VSBPD compare the text and their style in two 
websites, but if text content is replaced with picture then this scheme cannot able to compare these 
pages. BaitAlarm on the other hand compare the CSS of two websites, though the phishing site give 
same look yet they have very subtle differences with respect to the content, this approach uses visual 
similarities for phishing website detection. However, both scheme not describe that, how we choose a 
legitimate site from which, we compare any suspicious site. Storing information that describes image 
can be expensive as image take more space then data of any page used in heuristic schemes. In addition, 
large ‘false positive’ found as in heuristic schemes. 
 
In the recent years, Phishing attacks have become one of the most serious threats faced by the Internet 
users, organizations and service providers. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature for 
the detection and filtering of phishing attacks, however Internet community is still looking for a 
complete solution to secure the Internet from these attacks. The same is true for the lightweight IoT 
devices, where the botnets are already a major concern. These are virtually no ways to detect any 
breaches in these devices but to take them offline and update their software manually. 
Many security approaches have been proposed to secure IoT environment, but there are no such 
approaches for the detection of spam and phishing emails. Most of the approaches use encryption. But, 
these devices are not protected by anti-spam or anti-virus software, thus the IoT attacks cannot be 
resolved at the source site. Thus, the attacks on these devices are highly distributed in nature which 
results in malicious emails successfully reaching inboxes. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  AND SCOPE FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
It has been a couple of decades since the phishing problem arose, but it is still used to steal personal 
information, online credentials, and credit card details. There are various solutions available, but 
whenever any solution proposed to overcome these attacks, phishers came with the vulnerabilities of 
the solution to make the attach successful. From these attacks, we focus on the social engineering 
attacks, as it creates negative effect on online commerce. Phishers always used communication media 
for the fraudulent activities using spoofed emails and fake websites. It creates bad impression on e-
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commerce, which is very much necessary in this new era of Internet. Our survey helps new researchers 
to understand the history, current trends of attacks and failure of various available solutions. 
 
We classified social engineering phishing based on spoofed email attacks and fake websites. We have 
also classified various solutions either in the spoofed email filtering or in fake page detection. We 
further classify these solutions as per some common properties share between them. These 
classifications are based on blacklist, network, heuristics, some feature and various other properties. 
After the classification, we also described various issues and challenges in current solutions to 
understand the idea for future study to help the humanity by defending against phishing attacks. 
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